
History · 1982–today
Reduce to the max.
A Swiss watchmaker wanted a car no longer than a parking space is wide. Mercedes built it, lost billions on it, and quietly changed the shape of the European city.
Frankfurt, September 1997. The car is finished. It has been shown at the motor show, the factory in France is about to open, deliveries are set for spring. Then, a few weeks later, a Swedish magazine tips a brand-new A-Class onto two wheels in an evasive-maneuver test, and everyone at Daimler-Benz looks at the tall, narrow, two-and-a-half-meter car they are about to sell and asks the same question: what happens if we do that to this?
The answer was seven months of redesign — a lowered body, a wider rear track, stability control as standard — and a launch pushed from March to October 1998. Nicolas Hayek, the man whose idea the whole thing had been, went on German television and put the cost of the delay at around 300 million marks. By the time the first customers took delivery, he had sold his shares and walked away.
Chapter I · 1982–1993
The watchmaker's car.
Nicolas Hayek had already done the impossible once. The Lebanese-born consultant took the collapsing Swiss watch industry, gave it a cheap plastic watch you bought the way you bought a scarf, and made Swatch a global habit. From late 1982 he began asking why a car could not work the same way: standardized inside, endlessly personal outside, sold on design rather than displacement.
The press called it the Swatchmobile. Hayek described it to Autocar as a small electric car with room for "two people and two cases of beer," to be sold for a few thousand pounds. His own engineering company began the design work; the drivetrain was to be a hybrid.
He also knew he could not build it alone. Rather than take on the industry, he went looking for a partner inside it, and on 3 July 1991 shook hands with Volkswagen.
It did not survive the change of management in Wolfsburg. In 1993 the new leadership concluded that the Swatchmobile overlapped with VW's own three-liter small-car program and pulled out. Hayek's project was suddenly a set of drawings with no factory, no distribution and no money — and battery technology had not advanced anywhere near far enough to make his electric car cheap.
Chapter II · 1994–1997
Micro Compact Car.
The rescue came from the least likely direction. Daimler-Benz, a company that had spent a century selling large cars to serious people, was in the middle of shaking off its own conservatism — and its designers had been circling a similar idea. In March 1994 the two sides announced a joint venture: Micro Compact Car AG, Daimler engineering the car, Hayek responsible for the hybrid drive.
The first fight was over the name. Hayek wanted Swatch in it somewhere; Daimler wanted it nowhere. The compromise was an internal abbreviation nobody had meant as a brand — Swatch Mercedes art — polished into a word by the naming consultant Manfred Gotta. smart, lower case, forever.
Seventy-four candidate sites were narrowed to one, announced on 20 December 1994: Hambach, in French Lorraine, minutes from the German border. The purpose-built plant put the major suppliers on site, feeding modules straight into a cross-shaped assembly hall. Everyone called it Smartville.
What emerged was cleverer than the joke it looked like. The Tridion safety cell — a visible, high-strength steel shell, deliberately painted in a contrasting color — turned crash structure into styling. The plastic body panels bolted onto it could be swapped for a new color in an afternoon. The three-cylinder engine lay flat under the boot floor. Costs climbed, the hybrid drive stalled, and by 1996 Daimler had raised its stake to 81%.
- Length
- 2.5 m
- Engine
- 599 cc
- Cylinders
- 3
- Seats
- 2
The showroom
A tower of cars.
If the car was going to be sold like a consumer product, it needed a shop like one. From 1998 the smart centers came with a glass smart Tower: a floodlit vertical showroom with a hydraulic lift stacking finished cars behind the glass, dozens deep, on a footprint the size of a city plot. Around seventy of the standard towers went up across Europe. The largest, in Hamburg, stood 24 meters tall and held eighty-six cars.
Chapter III · 1998–2004
Beloved in Rome. Ignored in Hamburg.
The smart City-Coupé reached customers in October 1998, across a first wave of European markets, in four panel colors over an anthracite Tridion cell. In cities where parking is a blood sport it was an instant hit: Rome and Paris took to it immediately, because a car 2.5 meters long can be parked nose-in to the curb, in gaps nothing else fits.
Everywhere else, it was a curiosity. Roughly 20,000 were sold in that first part-year against an original ambition of 200,000 a year, and suppliers who had geared up for volumes that never came had to be compensated. Sales did climb — past 100,000 a year by the early 2000s — but the two-seater alone was never going to carry a brand.
So smart did what young brands do: it multiplied. A cabrio. The crossblade of 2002 — 2,000 numbered cars with no roof, no doors and no windscreen, just silver bars, a wind deflector and a Brabus-breathed 70 hp. Then, in 2003, an actual sports car: the smart roadster and its fastback roadster-coupé, 700 cc, mid-engined, barely a meter and a quarter tall.
The roadster was adored and unprofitable. It also leaked: warranty work on water ingress is estimated to have cost around €3,000 per car, and production stopped after 43,091 had been built. In 2004 came the first forfour, a five-door built in the Netherlands on a Mitsubishi Colt platform — sensible, roomy, and almost entirely lacking whatever made a smart a smart.


The bill · smart GmbH losses, 2003–2006
3.9 billion euros
The figure Handelsblatt drew from smart's own accounts for four years. Without it, Mercedes would have posted a record operating profit in 2006. The smallest car in the group was its most expensive habit.
Chapter IV · 2005–2013
Back to one car.
In April 2005, DaimlerChrysler stopped the experiment. The roadster would end that year. The planned smart SUV, the formore, was abandoned outright. Around 700 jobs went, mostly at the brand's Böblingen headquarters, and the restructuring alone was booked at up to €1.2 billion against a promise to break even by 2007. The forfour followed in March 2006, and smart GmbH was dissolved into Mercedes-Benz Cars.
What survived was the thing that had worked all along. The second-generation fortwo arrived in late 2006 — 200 mm longer, structurally tougher, engineered from the start for American crash rules — and went on sale across Europe in 2007 with 50,000 orders already taken.
In early 2008 it reached the United States, arriving exactly as fuel prices spiked, and for a moment the strangest car in America had a waiting list.
The third generation, unveiled in Berlin on 16 July 2014, was built with Renault: the fortwo and a revived forfour shared their platform and much of their hardware with the Twingo, the forfour built alongside it in Slovenia. Same silhouette, same exposed Tridion cell, same 2.69 meters. Nearly two decades in, the shape had become permanent.

Chapter V · 2019–today
Hayek's car, thirty years late.
On 28 March 2019, Daimler and Zhejiang Geely announced a 50:50 joint venture to own and run smart as an all-electric brand: designed by the Mercedes design network, engineered by Geely, built in China, registered capital 5.4 billion renminbi, headquarters at Hangzhou Bay in Ningbo. At the end of 2020 Mercedes sold Smartville itself to Ineos, which now builds off-roaders in the cross-shaped halls.
The new cars are not city cars. The smart #1 of 2022 is an electric crossover on Geely's SEA platform; the #3 is its coupé sibling; the #5 is bigger again. They are quick, richly equipped and about twice the length of the car that started it all.
And on 28 March 2024 — five years to the day after the joint venture was announced — the last fortwo, an electric cabrio, came off the line at Hambach. In twenty-six years the plant had built more than 2.5 million of them.
Nicolas Hayek died in 2010, having watched his hybrid city car become a petrol one, his name be negotiated out of the badge and his company sell its share before the first customer car was delivered. The brand is now exactly what he originally proposed: small, urban, electric. He simply asked for it thirty years too early.
- fortwos from Hambach
- 2.5 m+
- Years in production
- 26
- Roadsters built
- 43,091
- Crossblades built
- 2,000

Six turns in forty years.
From a watch factory in Biel to a joint venture on the Chinese coast.
1982
The Swatchmobile
Swatch boss Nicolas Hayek starts sketching a car built like a wristwatch.
1994
Micro Compact Car
Daimler-Benz and Hayek's SMH form a joint venture; the name smart is agreed a year later.
1998
Smartville opens up
After an elk-test delay, the City-Coupé finally goes on sale in October.
2003
Roadster and forfour
smart tries to become a full brand — and discovers how expensive that is.
2005
The reckoning
The roadster is killed, an SUV is abandoned, and smart is folded back into Mercedes.
2019
Electric, with Geely
A 50:50 joint venture moves smart to China and makes it all-electric.
Epilogue
The idea won anyway.
By any ordinary measure smart failed. It never made the money it was supposed to, it lost its founder before its launch, its expansion nearly took the brand down, and the factory built for it now belongs to somebody else.
And yet: it proved that a two-seat city car could be safe, desirable and premium; that crash structure could be a design feature; that a car could be sold like a consumer product, from a glass tower, in colors you swap. Every tiny urban EV and car-sharing runabout since has been arguing with the smart's answer, not asking its question. That was Hayek's real bet — and he was right about all of it except the timing.